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) Category 14(b) 
APPELLANTS1 REPLY BRIEF 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah statutory and case law provide that in cases of 
breach of a corporate director's fiduciary duty to the corporation, 
the pertinent statute of limitations begins to run only after the 
aggrieved party discovers, or should have discovered, the tortious 
conduct and the resulting damage or injury. The determination of 
when the statute of limitations began to run on defendant's cause 
of action based upon plaintiff's alleged tortious conduct is a 
matter best left to the trier of fact. The record demonstrates 
genuine issues of fact exist as to whether the disclosure allegedly 
made by plaintiff put defendants on notice of plaintiff's usurpa-
tion of a corporate opportunity. The trial court erred in holding 
as a matter of law that defendants' cause of action for breach of 
plaintiff's fiduciary duty as a corporate officer was barred by the 




DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ABANDON POINT II 
RAISED IN APPELLANTS1 INITIAL BRIEF. 
Based upon the representations made by respondent-
plaintiff in Point I of his brief, defendants-appellants hereby 
abandon their argument that plaintiff waived any right to rely upon 
the statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT DEFENDANTS1 CLAIM FOR 
USURPATION OF A CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY WAS 
BARRED BY THE PERTINENT STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
Plaintiff asserts that it is undisputed that he disclosed 
to the directors of Galaxy Advertising his acquisition of an equity 
interest in Palmer Outdoor Advertising. Respondent's Brief, pp. 
7-10. Plaintiff's argument, however, misses the mark. The perti-
nent statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-27, provides: 
Actions against directors or stockholders 
of a corporation to recover a penalty or 
forfeiture imposed, or to enforce a liabil-
ity created, by law must be brought within 
three years after the discovery, by the 
aggrieved party, the facts upon which the 
penalty or forfeiture attached, or the 
liability accrued. (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Jones Mining Co. v. Cardiff Mining & 
Milling Co., 56 Utah 49, 191 P. 426, 429 (1920), clearly held that 
in cases of breach of a corporate director's fiduciary duty to the 
corporation, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time 
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the complaining party "discovered the wrongs complained of or when 
he was apprised of such facts and circumstances with respect 
thereto as would put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence 
upon inquiry." 
A crucial issue of material fact exists in this appeal 
with regard to the nature of the disclosure allegedly made by 
respondent to the directors of Galaxy, Defendants respectfully 
submit that the record on appeal demonstrates the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the disclosure made by 
plaintiff. The nature of the disclosure made by plaintiff will, in 
turn, determine whether defendants or defendants1 predecessors in 
interest knew, or should have known, of the corporate opportunity 
of which plaintiff undisputedly availed himself. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 
199, 436 P.2d 435 (1968), recognized in applying the discovery 
doctrine in statute of limitations cases, that the determination of 
when a party knew, or should have known, of a legal injury is a 
matter to be resolved by the trier of fact. In Christiansen, 
defendant performed an operation on plaintiff in 1955. Apparently, 
during the course of the operation, defendant left a broken surgi-
cal needle inside plaintiff's body. Plaintiff did not file suit 
until 1965 when he discovered the presence of the needle. 
Defendant moved for summary judgment claiming that plaintiff's 
claims were barred by a four-year statute of limitation. Plaintiff 
unsuccessfully resisted the motion by asserting that the statute of 
limitations should not begin to run until the date he discovered 
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the presence of the foreign object in his body. The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the pertinent 
statute of limitations in Christiansen did not begin to run until 
the plaintiff had notice of the presence of the needle in his body. 
In applying the discovery rule to the facts of the case, and 
reversing and remanding the action back to the trial court, the 
court stated: 
In the instant case, there is serious ques-
tion as to whether, even in applying the 
discovery doctrine, the action is barred by 
the four-year statute of limitations. 
However, upon the record it is our judgment 
that the question of whether the plaintiff 
commenced his action within four years 
after he knew, or should have known, of the 
presence of the surgical needle in his body 
is an issue to be resolved by the trier of 
the facts. 
Christiansen, 436 P.2d at 437 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, other jurisdictions have recognized that whether 
the discovery rule tolls a statute of limitations is a matter best 
left to the trier of fact. In O'Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 503 
A.2d 1313 (1986), the court reversed the entry of judgment in favor 
of defendants on the basis of a statute of limitations defense. In 
O'Hara, plaintiff sued defendants for fraud in connection with the 
sale of certain stock in December, 1971. Plaintiff's complaint was 
not filed until late 1978. Plaintiff's suit was governed by a 
three-year statute of limitations. Defendants moved for summary 
judgment based on the statute of limitations defense. The trial 
court granted defendants' motion, finding as a matter of law that 
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plaintiff had notice of defendants' alleged fraudulent conduct more 
than three years prior to the filing of their complaint. In 
reversing the entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of 
defendants, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated: 
Both the trial court and the Court of 
Special of Appeals correctly recognized 
that the question of when the plaintiffs 
were on notice was a question of fact. 
Nevertheless, the trial court concluded, 
erroneously that this question of fact 
could be decided by the court. The Court 
of Special Appeals accepted that premise so 
that it reviewed the circuit court's sum-
mary judgment under the inapplicable stan-
dard of whether the trial judge's 
"fact-findings" were clearly erroneous. 
The circuit court, making a credibility 
determination, rejected, as "arbitrary and 
contrived," [plaintiffs'] account of how 
discovery had come about. The trial judge 
said that there were substantial 
"limitations-related facts on which this 
court can base a determination that 
plaintiffs' cause is barred by 
limitations." She then found that "on the 
basis of inference which reasonable persons 
would have drawn from the news reports," 
the plaintiffs . . . "at least have been 
put on notice to investigate the alleged 
wrongs more than three years before their 
suit was filed." The Court of Special 
Appeals affirmed as to [two of the 
plaintiffs] on the grounds that 
"limitations is still a matter for the 
judge rather than the jury even if the 
facts concerning discovery are disputed." 
O'Hara v. Kovens, 60 Md.App. at 6 29, 4 84 
A. 2d at 280. These holdings cannot be 
reconciled with fundamental summary judg-
ment law. 
O'Hara, 503 A.2d at 1320-21. See also, Petri v. Smith, 453 A.2d 
342, 347 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1982) (The standard of reasonable diligence 
under the discovery rule "may be best determined by the collective 
judgment, wisdom, and experience of jurors who have been selected 
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at random from the community whose standard is to be applied.") 
In the instant case, genuine issues of fact exist as to 
whether the disclosure allegedly made by Webb was sufficient to 
place defendants or defendants' predecessors in interest on notice 
of the possible usurpation of a corporate opportunity by him. The 
determination of whether an adequate disclosure was, in fact, made 
and whether the disclosure gave notice of the wrongs allegedly com-
mitted by Webb involve critical questions of fact that must be sub-
mitted to the trier of fact. The record in the instant case 
demonstrates that Webb admitted in his own deposition that he did 
not disclose to anyone at Galaxy Advertising that he had an option 
to purchase a majority interest in Palmer Outdoor Advertising prior 
to the consummation of the deal. (R. 1022 at pp. 62, 73). Webb 
has also admitted that his eventual disclosure to the board of 
directors may not have constituted a full disclosure. (R. 1022 at 
pp. 20-25, 60-62,70-75). 
The record also demonstrates that the other directors of 
Galaxy Advertising were unaware of Webb's purchase of an interest 
in Palmer Outdoor Advertising. (R. 1023 at pp. 8, 10, 32-35). 
George Hatch, a director of Galaxy Advertising, testified that Webb 
did not disclose the extent of his interest in Palmer Outdoor 
Advertising. IcL Furthermore, the affidavits submitted by defen-
dants also demonstrate that a question of fact exists as to the 




Based upon the state of the record before the trial court, 
the trial court erred in failing to find that genuine issues of 
material fact existed as to the nature of the alleged disclosure 
made by Webb to the board of directors of Galaxy Advertising. As a 
result, the trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that 
Webb was entitled to an order of partial summary judgment, 
dismissing R.O.A.'s counterclaim for usurpation of a corporate 
opportunity. The actions of the trial court should be reversed and 
remanded for resolution by the trier of fact. 
Dated this ^ 
STRONG & HANNI 
   fact. 
J^ZTTay o f ^ ^ K ^ ^ g L < 1989. 
*JjuL 4 
/^Philip R. Fisnler 
Stephen/ ju . Trayner 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant Reagan 
DOUGLAS T. HALL 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
R.O.A. 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc. 
No. 890170-CA and No. 890164-CA 
Gentlemen/Ladies: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, we 
hereby submit the following authorities that have recently come to 
the attention of Respondent Roland Webb's current counsel, who was 
not involved in the preparation of the briefs on appeal: 
Case No. 890170-CA 
1. Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence to Determine 
Completeness of Integration. Although not a recently discovered 
authority, Webb desires here to correct the statement of law set 
forth on page 13, footnote 1 of Respondent's Brief. The correct 
quotation from Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 
P.2d 266, 270 (1972), is as follows: 
In determining the issue of the completeness 
of the integration in writing, evidence 
extrinsic to the writing itself is admissible. 
2. Inadmissibility of Extrinsic Evidence to Add Terms 
Inconsistent With Partial or Total Integration. During oral 
argument, Webb's counsel referred to the admissions by R.O.A. 
General, Inc. ("R.O.A.") and William Reagan ("Reagan") that the two 
documents attached to the Amended Complaint ("Employment 
Agreement," dated August 1, 1981 and July 7, 1981 letter from 
Roland Webb to William Reagan) constitute at least a partial 
integration of a final, binding agreement. (See R.O.A.'s Answer 
to Amended Complaint, R. 203-04, para. 7, and Reagan's Answer to 
Amended Complaint, R. 275, para. 8.) Webb's counsel further argued 
that because the writings constitute at least a partial 
integration, terms inconsistent with the written terms cannot be 
Court Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
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June 7, 1990 
added through the introduction of parol evidence. With respect to 
that issue, the following three authorities are dispositive: 
Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 
P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983) (quoting 30 
Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 1043): 
The doctrine of partial integration is 
that where a written contract is 
obviously not, or is shown not to be, the 
complete contract, parol evidence not 
inconsistent with the writing is 
admissible to show what the entire 
contract really was, by supplementing, as 
distinguished from contradicting, the 
writing. In such a case parol evidence 
to prove the part not reduced to writing 
is admissible, although it is not 
admissible as to the part reduced to 
writing. (Emphasis added.) 
Restatement (Second), Contracts § 215: 
Except as stated in the preceding 
Section [not relevant here], where there 
is a binding agreement, either completely 
or partially integrated, evidence of 
prior or contemporaneous agreements or 
negotiations is not admissible in 
evidence to contradict a term of the 
writing. 
Calamari & Perillo, The Law of Contracts (West 
Publishing Co. 1970), p. 77, Sec. 40: 
A distinction is drawn between a 
total and a partial integration. Where 
the writing is intended to be final and 
complete, it is characterized as a total 
integration and may be neither contra-
dicted nor supplemented by evidence of 
prior agreements or expressions. But 
where the writing is intended to be final 
and incomplete, it is said to be a 
partial integration; although such a 
writing may not be contradicted by 
evidence of prior agreements or 
Court Clerk 
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expressions, it may be supplemented by 
evidence of consistent additional terms. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
The reason for the supplemental citation of the above 
authorities is that the dispositive issue of partial integration 
is not addressed in the briefs. 
3. Covenant or Condition? With respect to the argument as 
to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning 
whether R.O.A. can be excused from its obligations to pay the 
compensation promised to Webb by reason of a purported breach of 
the "best efforts" provision of the Employment Agreement (see 
Brief of Appellants, pp. 2-4; Brief of Respondent, p. 11; 
Appellants' Reply Brief, pp. 2-4), the following authorities are 
significant: 
Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1232 (Utah App. 
1988): 
The case law overwhelmingly favors the 
construction of a promise as a covenant 
as opposed to a condition precedent when 
the language is ambiguous. 
Porter v. Groover, 734 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 
1987): 
Whether a promise is conditional depends 
upon the parties' intent, which is 
derived from a fair and reasonable 
construction of the language used in 
light of all the circumstances when the 
parties executed the contract. 
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 
1985). 
Creer v. Thurman, 581 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1978): 
Whether a provision in a contract is 
a condition, the nonfulfillment of which 
excuses performance, depends upon the 
intent of the parties, to be ascertained 
from a fair and reasonable construction 
of the language used in light of all the 
Court Clerk 
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circumstances when they executed the 
contract. 
Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 953 (Utah 
1978): 
A simple statement or stipulation in a 
contract is not necessarily a condition 
to a party's duty of performance. The 
intention to create a condition in a 
contract must appear expressly or by 
clear implication. 
The reason for the supplemental citation of the above 
authorities is that the language in the written employment 
agreement provides that (1) the agreement cannot be terminated by 
R.O.A. for any reason other than fraud or gross malfeasance, and 
(2) the obligation of R.O.A. to pay Webb's compensation is "non-
cancellable for any reason, including death;" therefore, the "best 
efforts" provision cannot be a condition, the breach of which 
would excuse performance by R.O.A. of its obligations to pay 
Webb's compensation. The distinction between covenants and 
conditions was not addressed in the briefs, but was discussed 
during oral argument. 
Case No, 890164-CA 
Running of the Statute of Limitations. R.O.A. asserts there 
is a genuine question as to whether the three year statute of 
limitations under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-27, applicable to the 
claim that Webb usurped corporate opportunities by obtaining an 
interest in Palmer Outdoor Advertising, commenced running prior to 
three years before the filing of the Counterclaim, July 1987. 
That assertion is made notwithstanding William Reagan's Affidavit 
(R. 611, para. 5), where he states that "in June of 1981" he was 
informed "that Mr. Webb had previously obtained 51% of Palmer 
Advertising in Wyoming, surreptitiously." (Emphasis added.) 
Arguments concerning that issue are found in Brief of 
Appellants, pp. 11-15; Brief of Respondent, p. 7-10; Appellants' 
Reply Brief, pp. 2-6. 
A pertinent and significant authority, not cited in the 
briefs, respecting the "discovery rule" under the applicable 
statute of limitations is Stewart v. K&S Co., Inc., 591 P.2d 433, 
435 (Utah 1979): 
Court Clerk 
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[W]here there is a fiduciary relationship 
. . . the statute of limitations does not 
begin to run until the [plaintiff] discovers, 
or in the exercise of reasonable care should 
discover, that there is a wrong to be 
complained of . • . 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), seven copies of this letter are 
enclosed herewith. 
Very truly yours, 
Ross C. A n d e r s o n ^ 
RCA:rs 
cc: Philip R. Fishier, Esq. 
William H. Adams, Esq. 
Douglas T. Hall, Esq. 
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